By KRISTIAN HERBOLZHEIMER and EMMA LESLIE,
Conciliation Resources
The non-passage of the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) by Congress did not come as a surprise. It was a scenario foreseen by many since early after the Mamasapano tragedy in January last year. In fact, given the risks that Congress might enact a law that was not compliant with the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB), there was a shared understanding by stakeholders in the peace process that “no BBL is better than a bad BBL”.
And yet the non-passage has come with a heavy toll for all. It has led to deep disappointment and frustration at all levels, from the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) negotiating panels down to the grassroots. And it has opened up the fundamental question of what next?
It is clear that the political aspect of the peace process enters a period of hibernation: no major decisions on solving the Bangsamoro issue are expected at this final stage of the Aquino administration. Without a BBL there will be no plebiscite, no transitional authority, and no abolition of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). Consequently, the decommissioning of MILF combatants and weapons is also put on hold, as the next phase is conditional to the enactment of the BBL.
Taking stock of achievements
This immense setback may lead many to wonder whether the peace process has achieved anything? Whether it is back to square one?
The reality is that the prospects for peace in the Bangsamoro today are far better than they have ever been before. The Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) signed by the two parties in October 2012 and the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) signed on 27 March 2014 are here to stay. Both documents frame a win-win scenario, as they articulate the needs and expectations of the people in the Bangsamoro, as well as the structural reforms the central government feels are necessary to consolidate a more inclusive and cohesive nation.
Another development that cannot be overstated is the unprecedented explicit support to the peace process by a number of key stakeholders: the military, the business sector, the Catholic church and the international community are strong champions of the CAB, and key promoters for the resumption of agreement implementation during the next administration.
At the same time the multiple consultations during the drafting of the BBL, and the subsequent discussions in Congress have had two positive effects. On one hand people in the Bangsamoro have a better understanding of the content of the BBL and the envisioned change it will bring about. And in conducting their awareness-raising and advocacy campaigns, civil society activists are themselves much better equipped to articulate their needs and expectations; they also have a better understanding of the limitations of the national legislative process and, thereby, a clear vision of how different the regional legislative should be. In other words, the advocacy activities over these past months have significantly increased the social capital of the Bangsamoro and its allies in the rest of the Philippines.
The Bangsamoro stage of the peace process
While the ball is currently in the government’s court, it might also be relevant to re-frame the situation and consider the challenges from a different, more empowering perspective.
Several years ago, the MILF framed the peace negotiations as taking place first under a domestic stage (direct peace talks, 1997-2000), and later under a diplomatic stage (facilitated negotiations in Kuala Lumpur, since 2001).
After the signing of the CAB the peace process has probably entered a Bangsamoro stage.
The fundamental game-changer of the CAB is indeed that the Bangsamoro people are to take on the responsibility to lead the transformation of their society relying primarily on themselves.
Had the BBL been passed, an all-Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA) under the leadership of the MILF would be in charge of the transition from the ARMM to the Bangsamoro entity. In this journey, the BTA initially, and the Bangsamoro government shortly after, would take on the huge responsibility of managing the devolved power and responding to the expectations of their people.
This scenario has now been prevented by the lack of progress in Manila. It may therefore sound futile to discuss the challenges of Bangsamoro transition in the absence of a BBL. And yet a successful resumption of the peace process would bring this agenda back sooner than expected. With a CAB-compliant BBL in place, the responsibility of good governance transfers from the central government to the Bangsamoro. And that is a major paradigm shift that requires comprehensive preparation. (To be continued)
