A recurring theme that hounds researchers is the overly-abused argument of piracy being a way of life around the gulf of Davao and that the former Moro chieftain Datu Bago, who escaped Spanish arrest in 1848, was a copycat of Caribbean corsairs or English privateers.
The piracy in the gulf, however, is only slightly given mention in pre-Oyanguren accounts. Even the Recollects, who handled the missions in eastern Mindanao prior to fall of Davao did not cite of big-time slave raids lunched in Surigao and Davao Oriental in the decades leading to the collapse of the Datu Bago polity. This is quite curious given that most local historians banner, at times in pejorative terms, the datu’s supposed association with piracy.
Even in Recollect and Jesuit letters written in the post-1848 period, there is no big-time slave trade and piracy incidents being recorded. Sporadically, you read in accounts of isolated massacres and raids inflicted by several Moros against enemy tribes but nothing comes close to the incursions launched by the Maguindanao and Sulu sultanates in the Visayas and Luzon regions.
Understanding piracy in comparison to the magnitude of attacks led by the sultanates, the gulf, from 1800 to 1850 (the year Datu Bago died) was not host to any fiefdom with a naval force enough to brave the open seas with non-mechanized, sail-driven boats to conduct long-distance piracy outside the island of Mindanao.
Datu Bago and a handful of other chieftains around the gulf complimentarily ruled their respective turfs. Informally, these small domains, inferior in terms of naval and army strength, relied on each other for help in case they were threatened by external attacks. This partnership was evident after the fall of Davao when Islamized tribes, chiefly the Kalagans, attempted to ambush Spanish-led contingents as they expanded the conquest to the south.
Linking Datu Bago to piracy is allegorically built on shifting sand. At the least, there are several factors that debunk the supposed involvement of the Moros of the gulf, especially the enclave ruled by Datu Bago, in long-distance slave raids.
First, the region that spanned from Cape San Agustin to Sarangani Islands was not host to any church structures that came close to the cathedrals built by Spanish proselytizers outside Mindanao. Many of these brick houses of worship hosted gold-laced ornaments, gem-laden icons, and golden church vessels used by the clerics in celebrating the Mass and the sacraments.
Second, all (not just most) of the Moro fiefs around the gulf were either vassals of the Maguindanao sultanate or were dependent for their defense on the help of larger Moro kingdoms adjacent or within the gulf. Always threatened with running conflicts from non-Moro tribes, launching an organized piracy without the support of the sultanate support was susceptible to tribal attacks in territories controlled by the indigenous communities.
Third, Datu Bago’s lack of a naval component limited his contribution to long-distance piracy, if any, to simply giving conscripts to add muscle to the raiding teams. Still, the sultanates had enough subjects and slaves to accompany their slave trades and marauding activities without seeking help from smaller fiefs or vassal states.
Fourth, the Moro tribes, though controlling most of the littorals of Davao Gulf, were still wary that depleting their security forces in favor of supplying men long-distance raids could provide the troublesome tribal invaders, their direct menaces, reason to bring down their barricades.
And fifth, the recorded Moro attacks in mission accounts are chiefly confined to raiding small organized tribal settlements, attacking Chinese-owned stores, ambushing indigenous fishers in the open sea, vendetta, stealing of farm animals, and the occasional taking of slaves for ransom.
