The rise of assemblyman Douglas Ra. Cagas to the governorship of Davao del Sur as officer-in-charge (OIC) in 1987 shortly after serving as deputy minister of the local government and community development (MLGCD), was not without kinks. It was met with the opposition following his open declaration to declare war against the communist insurgents in his province.
Leonardo D. Suario, the replaced provincial governor, was harsh and outspoken when it came to the Nagkahiusang Katawhan sa Kalinaw (NAKASAKA), an anti-communist movement organized by then police provincial commander Lt. Col. Jesus Magno and strongly supported by Cagas. He called the organization “a goat in a sheep’s skin,” “a temporary relief,” and “only a palliative and will not be serving its purpose of countering insurgency or ensuring lasting peace.”
By then being appointed as acting vice governor, Suario even quizzed whether it was “legally and morally right to place the law in the hands of civilians” by allowing the NAKASAKA members to carry improvised arms, knives, bows and arrows, and other native self-defense weapons.
Suario, suspected as rebel sympathizer, told the newsmagazine Veritas in its March 5-11, 1987, issue: “What will prevent the rebels from coming back? You have a few hours of pulong-pulong and the civilians are left alone by the military. The barangay folks are not communists. They may be victims of coercive forces of the rebel movement. But if I were to use an analogy, I’d compare the situation to that of a ten-year-old prostitute. She is only a victim of society.”
He even suspected the NAKASAKA, which he compared to the Alsa Masa in Davao City, was part of low intensity conflict (LIC) introduced by Edward Landsdale, an influential Central Intelligence Agency operative. Both Cagas and Suario, however, were in agreement that the initial step to address the rebellion was to address its root cause. (LIC is defined as “the deployment and use of soldiers in situations other than war” that “are usually conducted against non-state actors and are given terms like counter-insurgency, anti-subversion, and peacekeeping.”)
Suario added: “If the government’s purpose is to unsheathe the sword of war, the civilians should only support the military. But in this case, it is the military supporting the civilians. What is the bolo against the Armalites of the rebels? We shouldn’t allow them (civilians) to patrol without necessary arms except bolo.”
Cagas, though, was not worried the anti-communist crusade would deviate from the main thrust to pursue peace. He even boasted that the anti-rebel organization has become the prototype for other local government units with the same intent to bring the insurgency. While there was no specific LGU program that was in place to address the main cause of insurgency, he proposed the construction of a rehabilitation center for returnees and their employment in government.
Around this time, around 100 New People’s Army regulars and 2,000 rebel sympathizers had already yielded to the government. For these persons to be accepted as surrenderers, the NAKASAKA founder had certain ‘established criteria’ such as “those who voluntarily gave aid to the movement, the letter couriers and driver-couriers, collectors, and regulars.”
NAKASAKA used five strategies in its anti-insurgency campaign: (i) a massive educational campaign on the evils of Communism compared to democracy’; (ii) creation of vigilante squads on the purok or sitio levels; (iii) installation of a monitoring, alarm and communications system using indigenous instruments; (iv) encouraging the people to arm themselves with ‘indigenous defensive weapons’; and (v) initiating the surrender of rebels and their sympathizers.”
Over forty years afterward, the insurrection has remained active though drastically reduced in membership, decimated in effectivity, and lost popular support.
