The holding of the 1934 Constitutional Convention that prepared the Commonwealth Constitution was in part triggered by the ominous Japanization efforts in Davao region even under American colonial rule. Underscoring this event was the rising opposition to allow the Japanese to own Philippine lands. This sentiment was later included in the 1935 Charter through the efforts of Davao assemblyman, and later city mayor, Pantaleon Pelayo, Sr.
How far had Japanization invaded Davao region is something that was already known publicly but were never misread as part of a grand plan to take over the city and make it a Japanese colony. In fact, “just before the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth, high government officials were awakened by the reality that certain important strategic portions of the island of Mindanao are under the absolute control of the Japanese.”
This scenario is best described by a pre-war DMHM (Daily Mirror, Herald, and Manila Chronicle) staff member who was quoted as saying:
“In Davao, the Japanese is born with the assistance of a Japanese doctor, educated in a Japanese school, steeped in Japanese religion, employed in a Japanese corporation, fattened on sukiyaki, clothed with Japanese garments, talked to in Japanese only, and buried when he dies by a Japanese undertaker, whether he remains in Davao or goes back to Japan to enjoy his fortune. And the Davao Filipino—how does he feel travelling on Japanese roads, working for Japanese masters, shopping in Japanese stores, getting his wages figuratively in yens, and depending entirely on the Japanese for his wherewithal? Verily, the Davao Japanese is at home—but the Davao Filipino is in Japan!”
At the time the Commonwealth was established, nearly half of the cultivated lands in Davao province, roughly 60,702 hectares were under Japanese holdings. Of the 71 million hills of abaca reported, 70% or 49.7 million of these were owned by the Japanese. The combined assets of the forty-five Japanese corporation in Davao amounted to PhP3,568,180, exclusively of the forty-five plantations, agricultural companies and those owned by private individuals, assessed at PhP1,002,680. All in all, Japanese business assets reached PhP4,570,860.
A research done by Manuel Gallego, which he collated in the book Economic Emancipation: An Independent View of the Philippine Economic Problems and Their Solution (1939), it was noted that by 1934, the Japanese already controlled 55% of the lumber and timber export of Davao province, and cornered 61% of the abaca export. Interestingly, 80% of the needs of Davao were sourced from Japan and only about 3% came from the United States.
In the fields of human activities, Gallego found out, nearly all jobs employed Japanese labor. So ubiquitous were the Japanese, by now numbering close to 16,000 in Davao region (out of a population of 145,075) that they “work[ed] as planters, fishermen, farm contractors, farm laborers, lumbermen, mechanics, carpenters, painters, tinsmiths, industrial laborers, merchants, corporation employees, chaffeurs, photographers, and barbers.”
Total Japanese investments in Davao province prior to the war reached PhP50 million, so much so that half of the revenues the government earned were from Japanese residents. Moreover, one-fourth of the 134 kilometers of road constructed in Davao during that time were owned by the Japanese.
In assessing the Japanization of Davao, Gallego cited three reasons deemed were of “strategic value” in the future policy of Japan in the country. First, Davao furnished the missing link to Japan’s ocean lifeline; second, with Davao in the link, Japan’s defense became airtight; and third, with the region in Japanese hands, it became “a most strategic base of attack for the feared Nipponic conquest of the Dutch East Indies.” True enough, the assessment fell into place when the country—Davao, in particular—was drawn into the war theatre.
While Davao was the population center of Japanese pre-war migrants in the country, a fourth of the Japanese expatriates took economic control in other provinces and cities. In Manila, the Japanese merchants lorded it over in Rizal Avenue (Avenida Rizal), in the same way they controlled certain business districts in Iloilo and Cebu. Daido Boeki Kaisaha, Ltd., the only hemp company in Cebu, had a PhP100,000 concrete warehouse, while a Japanese shoe factory also in the same province was producing an average output of 2,000 pairs daily.
But there were more Japanese imprints in Cebu than was traditionally known. On a daily basis, Japanese steamers were unloading Japanese goods and textiles, and there was a school built there so the children of the Japanese would “grow up 100% Japanese.”
In the national scene, Japanese ownership of fishing vessels reached 50% while 21.3% of the Filipino-owned boats were manned by Japanese. Moreover, 9.4% of the vessels owned by companies had Japanese incorporators. In the field of retail, it was estimated that during the Commonwealth period 35% of all the retail trade in the country were in Japanese hands such that by 1940 it was projected to nearly double at 80%.
This unusually vibrant involvement of the Japanese in the Philippine economy, Gallego opined, was due to the observation that their government was “back[ing] up to 16,000 trade adventurers who leave their shores every year by insuring them against loss and at the same time, guaranteeing them a return of at least 10% of their investment.”
